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Arguments Appealing to Racial Prejudice:
Uncertainty, Impartiality, and the Harmless Error

Doctrine
A keen observer has said that "next to perjury, prejudice is the main
cause of miscarriages of justice." If government counsel in a criminal
suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by irrelevantly arousing their deepest
prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a lethal weapon directed
against defendants who may be innocent. He should not be permitted
to summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice.

Judge Jerome Frank'
INTRODUCTION
Arguments by the prosecution contrived to stimulate latent racial prejudice 2
represent a brazen attempt to subvert a defendant's sixth amendment right
to trial' by an impartial jury. 4 Whether express or implied, such arguments

1. United States v. Antonelfi Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
2. Shocking appeals by defense counsel to racial prejudice have also occurred. See, e.g.,
Kornegay v. State, 174 Ga. App. 279, 329 S.E.2d 601 (1985). In Kornegay the defense counsel
in an interracial rape case stated in closing argument, "I told them [when I went to see them
before trial], 'Y'all are the sorriest bastards I have ever seen,' telling these [referring to
defendants], I said, 'Y'all niggers 40 or 50 years ago would be lynched for something like
this ...

."' Id. at 280, 329 S.E.2d at 603. The defense counsel reinforced his statements with

what the court called "further demeaning references and stories regarding race" and summed
up the argument by saying, "It just ain't right for them [the [hitchhiker victims]] to come
through here doing what they did and it was not right for the two niggers to do what they
did." Id. at 280, 329 S.E.2d at 603.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See Kornegay, 174 Ga. App. at 282, 329 S.E.2d at 605.

4. See Kornegay, 174 Ga. App. at 282, 329 S.E.2d at 605. An extensive listing of examples
of appeals to the racial prejudices of the jury can be found in B. GERS&MAN, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT § 10.2(d) (1985). See Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1979)

("Not one white witness has been produced in this case that contradicts [the victim's] position
in this case."); Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("[Mlaybe the
next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the tracks; maybe it will be
somebody that you know."); United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 15361 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing repeated references to distinguishing characteristics of black
defendants); Holland v. State, 247 Ala. 53, 53, 22 So. 2d 519, 520 (1945) ("You should
consider the fact that Mary Sue Rowe is a young white woman and that this defendant is
black for the purpose of determining his intent at the time he entered Mrs. Rowe's home.");
Harris v. State, 209 Miss. 141, 147-48, 46 So. 2d 91, 93 (1950) ("[T]he defendant [was] a big,
black gorilla with arms as long as your legs."); People v. Walker, 66 A.D.2d 863, 864, 411
N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (1978) (use of racial epithets in describing defendants violates rights).
See also Smith v. Indiana, 516 N.E.2d 1055 (Ind. 1987). Smith concerned the trial of a
black defendant charged with killing a white police officer. The prosecutor's closing remarks
to an all-white jury included a racially-sensitive description of a black defense witness' demeanor
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foster jury bias through untested racial stereotypes and group predilections, 5
thereby impelling the jury to ignore relevant, perhaps exculpatory, arguments
based on the legitimate evidence in the case. 6 Moreover, such appeals
represent an explicit affront to the concept of equal protection 7 by most

definitions 8 and ultimately threaten core constitutional values. 9

In Chapman v. California,0 the Supreme Court applied the harmless

error doctrine to an improper comment by the prosecution on a defendant's
failure to testify." The Court rejected the defendant's argument that all

such errors of constitutional dimension require automatic reversal. 12 Rather,

while testifying ("She did a little shucking and jiving on the stand." Brief for Petitioner at
76, Smith v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1055 (Ind. 1987) (No. 49S00-8610-PC-918) [hereinafter Brief
for Petitioner]) and a description of the defendant's actions strongly tending to evoke negative
racial stereotypes ("[The defendant] couldn't be satisfied with tearing [the victim's] gut's apart
with the first shot. Oh, no. He's got to play super-fly and come out here and blow holes in
a man who is lying dying on the sidewalk." Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 76). The Indiana
Supreme Court found no error in the prosecutor's argument because the language's "use
reminds the jury of the untrustworthy appearance of [the] witness," Smith, 516 N.E.2d at
1064 (emphasis added), although the court conceded that the prosecutor's reference to the
black witness "was clearly of black origin, used to ... talk in a patently misleading or evasive
manner." Id. For a discussion of the effects of racially prejudicial language, see infra notes
89-96 and accompanying text.
5. Express appeals to racial prejudice invite the jury to maintain the fiction that the
defendant is separate and somehow inferior to themselves. See, e.g., Haynes, 481 F.2d at 15361. Implied appeals to racial prejudice usually take the form of an argument based on untested
racial predilections. See Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1978). See also
infra note 96.
6. See Haynes, 481 F.2d at 157; see also McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 416-17 (2d
Cir. 1979).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

8. See McFarland, 611 F.2d at 416-17; see also Kornegay, 174 Ga. App. at 282, 329
S.E.2d at 605. The court in Kornegay was unequivocal in its position on the use of racial
prejudice:
The factor of racial prejudice has been formally and officially squelched in our
isociety after long and arduous struggles. Where it remains informally, it cannot
be condoned. Certainly, then, its use cannot be invoked by counsel in a court
of law, without running counter to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments'
guarantees.
Id. at 282, 329 S.E.2d at 605. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 134-39 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority in Batson for applying
equal protection analysis to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, stating that "there
is simply nothing 'unequal' about the State's using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also used to
exclude whites in cases involving white defendants." Id. at 137. A full treatment of the equal
protection claims potentially available to the target of courtroom racial prejudice is beyond
the scope of this Note.
9. See McFarland, 611 F.2d at 416-17. See also supra note 8.
10. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
11. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRD43nanAL PROCEDURE 1001 (1985) [hereinafter LAFAVE &
ISRAEL]. The prosecutor's comment in Chapman clearly violated the constitutional standard
announced two years before in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The California
Supreme Court, stressing the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, had held this
Griffin violation harmless under the California harmless error standard. Id.
12. Id.
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the Court held that an otherwise valid conviction will not be set aside if

the errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 3 Since Chapman, the
Court has shown a marked commitment to extend the sweep of the doctrine

to reach previously untouched areas. 1 4 This commitment culminated in the
Court's recent adoption of a strong presumption in favor of harmless error
analysis.' 5 At the same time, the Court has been notably reluctant to
recognize any new exceptions beyond those explicitly stated in Chapman.'6

This Note contends that the recently formulated strong presumption in
favor of applying harmless error analysis should not reach racially prejudicial
arguments by the prosecution. Once such an argument is identified, the
remedy must be automatic reversal.' 7 To support this conclusion, Section I

13. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. The Court's holding in Chapman was restated in Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986): "[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside
if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 680-81.
14. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HAgv. L. REv. 100, 113 (1986).
See also Developments in the Law-Race and the CriminalProcess, 101 HAxv. L. REv. 1472,
1593-94 (1988) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (citing United States v. Hastings, 461
U.S. 499, 509-12 (1983) for holding that a comment on the defendant's failure to challenge
certain charges was harmless error and Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1974)
for holding that a comment on the defendant's offer to plead guilty to a lesser charge was
harmless error).
15. The recent case of Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) clearly demonstrates the Court's
resolve to further expand the applicability of the harmless error doctrine through a new strong
presumption in favor of applying harmless error analysis. See id., 478 U.S. at 579; see also
supra note 13. Although Justice Stevens concurred in the application of the harmless error
rule to a violation of the rule formulated in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (an
instruction that effectively shifts the burden on proof about criminal intent to the defendant
violates due process), which occurred in Rose, he dissented from that portion of the majority
opinion by Justice Powell that recognized a strong presumption in favor of harmless error
analysis. The result is a five-Justice majority supporting the strong presumption dictum. See
Rose, 478 U.S. at 586-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 108.
17. This Note argues that all forms of harmless error analysis are inappropriate when
applied to improper racial statements by the prosecution. Although there is some debate
concerning which standard of harmless error analysis should be applied, courts continue to
use harmless error analysis. The Eleventh Circuit is notably split over whether the "prejudice
prong" of Strictland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) is the appropriate standard to
determine if an allegedly improper argument requires reversal of a state conviction or death
sentence. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383,
1399-413, 1426 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 106 S.Ct. 3325 (1986).
See also Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1095 n.12 (11th Cir), reh'g granted, 828 F.2d
1497 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd en banc, 844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1988); Robison v. Maynard,
829 F.2d 1501, 1509 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating the test for reversal of a state conviction as
whether there is a "reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different");
Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1483-84, 1489 (11th Cir.) (en banc), remanded, 474 U.S.
1001 (1985), on remand en banc, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
1359 (1986); United States v..Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985) (employing the
standard from United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985), to an improper comment on
the defendant's patriotism). Significantly, however, none of these cases concerned improper
arguments by the prosecution designed to summon racial prejudice. Cf. infra notes 71-87 and
accompanying text.
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will develop the uncertainty principle, an implicit, doctrinally-based exception to harmless error analysis found in cases where the prejudicial effect
of the particular type of error cannot be determined. 18 Section II will discuss
the scope of the explicit impartial adjudicator exception recognized in
Chapman and reaffirmed in subsequent cases. 19 Finally, Section III will
examine these exceptions in light of current socio-psychological research
and ultimately conclude that harmless error analysis should not be applied
to improper racial arguments. 20

I.

THE HARMLESS ERROR UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

The harmless error doctrine is grounded on an implicit assumption that
a reviewing court can determine with certainty whether a particular deprivation is minor or trivial and thus would not have contributed to the
defendant's conviction. 2 ' The doctrine seeks to conserve scarce judicial
resources by avoiding unnecessary retrials without sacrificing valued substantive rights.? Harmless error analysis, however, is an unavailing exercise
where the type of error at issue is widely recognized as having a prejudicial
effect on the jury's verdict. 23 When a specific type of error is invariably
prejudicial, applying harmless error analysis simply wastes judicial resources. 24 Once an error of this magnitude is identified, 25 a further search
of the record for prejudicial impact is unnecessary. 26 Similarly, when the
prejudicial effect of a particular category of error is too uncertain to be

18. See infra notes 21-61 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 71-107 and accompanying text.
21. See Anderson v. Warden, 696 F.2d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("Harmless
error analysis essentially involves the question of whether the error is but a 'small errorfl or
defect that [has] little, if any, likelihood of having affected the result of the trial."' (citations
omitted)); cf. R. TRAYNOR, THE RrODIE or HARmEiss ERROR 50 (1970) ("Reversal for error,
regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and
bestirs the public to ridicule it.").
22. Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53
MINN. L. Rav. 519, 543 (1969).
23. In similar fashion, when a certain error is acknowledged by the courts as undeviatingly
nonprejudicial, harmless error analysis is unnecessary. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik,
475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) ("Measured by the petit jury's verdict . . .any error in the grand jury
proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
But see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (setting aside a conviction because of racial
discrimination in the composition of the grand jury that indicted the defendant).
24. Since prejudicial errors can never be deemed harmless, applying the doctrine is futile.
See Mause, supra note 22.
25. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). The introduction of a coerced confession will
almost always be prejudicial. Mause, supra note 22, at 543.
26. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 21, at 57 ("There may be some 'errors or defects' that so
'affect the substantial rights of the parties' as to call for automatic reversal within or outside
the scope of any harmless-error rule, without any review of the evidence to determine whether
such errors or defects affected the judgment.").
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dependably ascertained, a reviewing court will never be able to certify that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard
of review required by the doctrine. 27 Applying harmless error analysis
squanders judicial resources and, more significantly, creates a possibility
that a reviewing court might inaccurately certify such an error as nonprejudicial.
Harmless error as doctrine rests on an underlying assumption that minor
errors and those errors which affect a defendant's substantial rights can be
successfully distinguished. This assumption, together with the aforementioned reasons has led commentators to suggest that an implicit exception
to applying the harmless error rule must exist in cases where the requisite
level of certainty is absent.2 For purposes of this Note, this can be called
the harmless error "uncertainty principle." ' 29 The principle, simply stated,
recognizes that particular errors exist whose prejudicial impact is necessarily
undeterminable and, consequently, by avoiding harmless error analysis, a
rule of automatic reversal eliminates uncertainty and maximizes fairness
while conserving judicial resources.
Chapman v. California° set forth three exceptions to applying harmless
error analysis which clearly illustrate the uncertainty principle: 1) a denial
of counsel, 3 2) a biased judge,3 2 and 3) a coerced confession.33 In all of
these situations, a reviewing court will not be able to determine with certainty
the actual impact of the error on the verdict. In cases such as Gideon v.
Wainwright,3 4 where the defendant is denied his constitutional right to
counsel, no appellate court can fairly determine what might have ensued at
trial had such a deprivation not occurred." Even if the defendant does a
credible job of self-representation and proof of guilt is overwhelming, there
remains a strong potential for serious omissions in the record. 36 To be
certain that all of the relevant evidence and arguments that competent legal
counsel might have presented at trial were in fact presented to the jury, a
reviewing court would be forced to conduct a massive factual investigation
since the trial record will merely reflect what was actually presented. Clearly,

27. See generally Mause, supranote 22, at 540-47. For a list of cases discussing the harmless
error standard, see supra note 17.
28. See generally Mause, supra note 22, at 540-47.
29. This term is borrowed, with apology, from the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which
suggests that it is impossible to know simultaneously both the exact location and speed of an
electron. See WEBSSmR's T=mn NEw INTERNATioNAL DicTIONARY 2484 (1986).

30.
31.
32.
33.

386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
Id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
Id. (citing Payne, 356 356 U.S. 560).

34. 372 U.S. 335.
35. Mause, supra note 22, at 541.
36. See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (stating that the defendant might not establish
an adequate record for a later appeal of issues raised at trial).
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an appellate court is not the appropriate forum to engage in such an
investigation. 37 These attendant difficulties prompted the Supreme Court to
recognize an exception to the harmless error rule based in part on the
uncertainty principle.
3
The uncertainty principle is also evident in cases like Tumey v. Ohio. 1
When the trial judge has a financial incentive to convict, the defendant is
presumed to have been denied a fair trial. Given the wide discretion afforded
the trial court, the effect of a judge's financial interest in the outcome of
the case on rulings throughout the trial is too speculative to be adequately
evaluated." As in the denial of counsel cases, the trial record will likely be
incomplete. A reviewing court bent on attempting to discern the error's
effect would be forced to engage in either flagrant guesswork or extensive
investigation. Nothing less than a thorough and time-consuming examination
of every discretionary trial ruling would likely suffice. 4° The expenditure of
resources would be vast and the result achieved would be at best a Pyrrhic
victory. Again, the reviewing court's role in the judicial system would be
compromised.
In Payne v. Arkansas,41 the indeterminate prejudicial effect of a coerced
confession on the jury was acknowledged as sufficient to create an exception
to harmless error analysis. 42 The Court expressly refused to countenance
any speculation regarding the effect of coerced confessions on a jury:
[W]here, as here, a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence
before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what
credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has uniformly held that even though there may have
been sufficient evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support
a judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of

the coerced confession vitiates the judgment

. . .43

Because a jury is likely to accord great weight to any confession, the
prejudicial effect on the verdict is too significant to be easily discounted.
By rejecting harmless error analysis in this context, the Court in part relied
on the uncertainty principle.
Four recent Supreme Court cases further demonstrate a tacit acceptance
of the uncertainty principle. Rose v. Clark" and Delaware v. Van Arsda145
recognize that speculative inquiries are inconsistent with the harmless error

37. See J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CnM PROCEDURE 598-99 (1985).
38. 273 U.S. 510.
39. See id. at 535. See also R. TRAYNOR, supra note 21, at 65. The vast discretion of the
trial judge is easily recognized. See, e.g., FED. R. EvrD. 403.
40. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 21, at 65.
41. 356 U.S 560.
42. Id. at 568.
43. Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
44. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).

45. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
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doctrine. In restating the test for harmless error, the Court supplements the
doctrine with language supporting the uncertainty principle. 4 6 First, the
Court in Van Arsdall states that "an otherwise valid conviction should not
be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record,'47
that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court specifically rejects speculation about whether the error was
harmless by demanding "confidence." Second, further recognition of the
uncertainty principle can be seen in the Court's distinction between the
types of errors which affect the composition of the trial record, where
difficult inquiries are necessary concerning matters not in evidence, and
those errors which leave the record unaffected. 48 There is a heightened
concern for the integrity of the record which follows from the recognition
that reviewing courts are confined to the formal trial record when investigating the possible prejudice flowing from the asserted error. 49 This heightened concern shows the Court's sensitivity to the danger of a baseless
inquiry.
In Gray v. Mississippi the Court refused to apply harmless error analysis
to the improper exclusion of a juror for cause in a capital case. Although
the prosecutor indicated that he would have used one of the state's unexercised peremptory challenges had the juror not been excluded for cause,
the Court nevertheless found the jury selection process too speculative for
harmless error analysis.51 The decision rested in part on the realization that
the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges was irrevocably tied to
strategy. 2 The Court refused to delve into the multiplicity of factors which
might have contributed to the prosecutor's decision to employ the peremptory challenge.53 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he facts before us illustrate
why a harmless-error analysis is inappropriate ....

[I]t is difficult on

appeal to reconstruct the prosecutor's voir dire strategy, and to predict who
54
would have been excluded had the facts been different. '
The clearest example of the uncertainty principle may be found in Vasquez
v. Hillery,5 in which the Court invalidated a twenty-year-old murder con-

46. Compare Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681 with Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. The comparison
shows the added certainty language.
47. 475 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added).
48. Rose, 478 U.S. at 579.
49. The Court at this point makes reference to errors involving the denial of the right to
counsel and judicial bias. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 579 n.7. Comparable language in the Van
Arsdall opinion is unclear.
50. 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987).
51. Id. at 2055.
52. Id. at 2057 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 2054-55 n.15.
54. Id. at 2057 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. 474 U.S. 254.
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viction because of racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process.5 6
Rejecting the state's contention that the defendant's subsequent conviction
by a fairly constituted petit jury rendered any errors in the indictment
harmless, 57 the Court stated as follows:
When constitutional error calls into question the objectivity of those
charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can
neither indulge (a presumption of regularity nor evaluate the resulting
harm. Accordingly, when the trial judge is discovered to have had some
basis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden
from review, and we must presume that the process was impaired. 8
Once having found discrimination in the selection of a grand jury,
we simply cannot know that the need to indict would have been assessed
in the same way by a grand jury properly constituted. The overriding
imperative to eliminate this systemic flaw in the charging process, as
well as the difficulty of assessing its effect on any given defendant,

requires our continued adherence to a rule of mandatory reversal.

9

The Court also said of the adverse pretrial publicity cases that "we have
required reversal . .. because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained." 60 Although decidedly concerned with the impartial adjudicator
exception, 6' the Court's language nevertheless rejects speculation about the
effect of these errors on the jury and thereby recognizes the uncertainty
principle as one important theoretical basis for harmless error exceptions.
II.

THE IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATOR EXCEPTION

While the uncertainty principle is logically discernible from the implicit
certainty requirements underlying the harmless error doctrine, Chapman v.
California2 expressly recognized that trials tainted by the existence of biased
adjudicators call for automatic reversal. 63 From the inception of harmless
error analysis, the Supreme Court has asserted that the defendant's right
to trial by an impartial adjudicator is so fundamental that its denial would
be invariably prejudicial.6 In support of this proposition, the Chapman
Court cited Tumey v. Ohio,65 making clear its intention to look beyond the

56. Id. at 262.
57. Id. at 260.
58. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 263 (citing Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 351-52 (1966)).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 62-70.
62. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
63. See id.at 23.
64. Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2056-57 (1987).
65. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). The Tumey
Court made clear its position: "A conviction must be reversed if the trial judge's remuneration
is based on a scheme giving him a financial interest in the result, even if no particular prejudice
is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty." 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
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uncertainty principle alone as justification for shunning harmless error
analysis in these cases. "No matter what the evidence was against [the
defendant], he had the right to have an impartial judge. '66 When the judge's
impartiality is in question, the Court's language leaves no room for any
appellate court to sustain a conviction on the possibility that the effect of
the error might be minor or inconsequential. No amount of evidence would
be sufficient to overcome the presumed prejudice flowing from adjudicator
bias. The potential prejudice associated with a biased adjudicator is considered so subversive to the integrity of the judicial process that the Court
recognizes it as a complete and independent exception. 67
Since Chapman, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the biased
adjudicator exception. Although the Court was sharply divided on other
grounds, no Justice in Gray v. Mississippi6 took issue with the majority's
language reaffirming this exception: "[B]ecause the impartiality of the
adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system, the Chapman
harmless-error analysis cannot apply.' '69 The language added emphasis to
previous statements that the existence of a biased adjudicator could never
be deemed harmless.70 The primary significance of this approach rests upon
an express recognition that an exception exists for these cases based on the
integrity of the judicial system which goes beyond the simple pragmatic
concerns of the uncertainty principle.
III.

APPEALS TO RACIAL PREIUmcE AND HAR LmESS ERROR

In United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick,71 the Second Circuit
72
Court of Appeals indicated for the first time since Chapman v. California
that harmless error analysis might be inappropriate when applied to racially
prejudicial statements by the prosecution.7 Although not directly confronted
with the issue, the Second Circuit nevertheless found "[r]acially prejudicial
remarks are ... so likely to prevent the jury from deciding a case in an
impartial manner and so difficult, if not impossible, to correct once introduced, that a good argument for applying a more absolute standard may
be made." 74 The Second Circuit's analysis reflects an understanding of the

66. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535.
67. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 21, at 65.
68. 107 S. Ct. 2045.
69. Id. at 2056.

70. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681

(1986).

71.
72.
73.
74.

481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1973).
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
481 F.2d at 161.
Id. (emphasis added).
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available sociological theory of the period 75 which supported a finding that
racial prejudice can violently affect a juror's impartiality. 76 The opinion
strongly emphasizes the need to remove racial prejudice from the courtroom,
warning that
[m]ore than just harm to the individual defendant is involved .... For
the introduction of racial prejudice into a trial helps further embed the
already too deep impression in public consciousness that there are two
standards of justice in the United States, one for whites and the other
for blacks. Such an appearance of duality in our recently troubled times
is, quite77 simply, intolerable from the standpoint of the future of our
society.
Clearly influenced by Haynes, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded five years later in Miller v. North Carolina78 that racially oriented
79
arguments potentially engender serious bias and require automatic reversal.
The Fourth Circuit found error in the prosecution's "blatant appeal to
racial prejudice in the assertion that no white woman would consent to
sexual intercourse with a black man." 80 Since the prosecutor's assertion
directly contradicted Miller's defense of consent, 8' the court found the error
prejudicial, obviating the need to engage in harmless error analysis.12 In
dictum, the court reasoned that harmless error analysis was inappropriate,
stating, "[W]e incline to the view that the instant case falls into the category
of constitutional violations to which, as Chapman v. California recognizes,
the harmless error rule does not apply.''83

75. See id. at 157 (citing G. ALLPORT, DIE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1955); B. BEmr ueam
& M. JANowrrz, SOCIAL CHANGE AND PREJUDICE (1964); S. BLACKBURN, WHrrE JUSTICE;
BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA'S COURTROOM (1971); J. KovAL, WirrE RACISM, A PSYCHOISTORY (1970)).
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 708.
80. Id. The prosecutor stated that "the average white woman abhors anything of this type
in nature that had to do with a black man." Id. at 704. The court also observed, "The
prosecutor's summation was noteworthy not only for its statements about race. Quoting from
Romans 13, [the prosecutor] informed the jury that the law enforcement powers of the district
attorney come from God and that to resist those powers was to resist God." Id. at 704 n.3.
81. Id. at 708 ("Where the jury is exposed to highly prejudicial argument by the prosecutor's
calculated resort to racial prejudice on an issue as sensitive as consent to sexual intercourse in
a prosecution for rape, we think that the prejudice engendered is so great that automatic
reversal is required.").
82. See id.
83. Id. at 708. But see United States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1045 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 967 (1970) (given the weak case against the defendant, the Court found "the claim

of deliberate injection of race prejudice in the United States Attorney's cross examination" to
have greater significance). See also United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1559-60 (11th
Cir. 1985) (applying harmless error analysis to an improper comment that the defendants were
"liars" and had "spit on the country that had accepted them," and citing United States v.
Young, 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1985), which held that the prosecutor's invited response to defense
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The Fourth Circuit found harmless error analysis inappropriate on two
grounds. 84 First, racial arguments threaten juror impartiality by encouraging
the jury to use negative racial stereotypes in determining guilt.8" Alternatively, these arguments have a profound impact on the entire proceeding
thereby making the error's impact on the jury impossible to ascertain."6
Here the uncertainty principle provides the theoretical foundation for the
87
court's analysis.

A.

The Impartial Adjudicator Exception Applied

The defendant's constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury is
threatened when there exists a strong possibility that the jury will accept
the state's improper argument. There is a high probability that entirely

unsupported racial stereotypes will trump legitimate evidence. An even more
intolerable situation exists should the prosecution's remarks encourage the
jury to assign criminal culpability based on dormant racial hatred. "In such
a case the impartiality of the fact-finder is fatally compromised. Because
that contamination may affect the jury's evaluation of all of the evidence
before it

. .

. [r]eversal must be automatic." 88

Current studies lend empirical support to the contention that arguments
designed to invoke racial stereotypes will have a pervasive influence on the
jury. In a University of North Carolina study of group decision-making
situations similar to jury deliberations, the researchers found that derogatory
ethnic slurs against blacks encouraged anti-minority prejudice in listeners. 9
Reviewing a number of studies, the researchers concluded that, although it
was socially undesirable to demonstrate overt prejudice, privately held

counsel was not plain error). The court stated, "Our task is to determine the probable effect
the improper comment had on the jury." 765 F.2d at 1560. Significantly, the court in
Rodriguez found the prosecutor's remarks "perilously close to an attempt to take advantage
of any negative feelings the jury may have had toward recent Cuban immigrants." Id. at 1560
n.19. This might indicate that the court is willing to view an appeal to racial prejudice
differently. See generally Manse, supra note 22, at 540-47; Note, Harmless Constitutional
Error: A Reappraisal,83 HARv. L. R-v. 814, 820-24 (1970).
84. Miller, 583 F.2d at 708.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
86. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 708.
87. The concern with jury bias is analytically distinguishable from the uncertainty principle;
the actual effect of racial arguments is independent of their tendency to incurably complicate
the reviewing court's task in finding them harmless.
88. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 708.
89. Greenberg & Pyszczynski, The Effect of an OverheardEthnic Slur on Evaluations of
the Target: How to Spread a Social Disease, 21 J. EXPERnmENTAL Soc. PsYcHoLoOy 61, 70

(1985).
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attitudes remain ambivalent toward blacks. 90 The expression of these attitudes of ambivalence can be triggered by situational cues. 91 According to
the researchers, "[a]lithough current norms may favor racial equality and
egalitarian treatment of all, as a result of early socialization experiences,
92
many whites in this culture may still harbor deeply rooted prejudices.''
The results suggested that when ethnic slurs were expressed by one member
of the group, other members' evaluations of the target were affected. 93
"[A]n individual displaying prejudice against blacks may cue negative schemata concerning blacks."194 Where the ethnic slurs come from the prosecution, a similar effect should be anticipated. Indeed, the possible effect on
listeners could be greatly increased since the prosecutor is an authority
figure for the jury and speaks with the "imprimatur of the government." 95
The practical implication of the study is clear: "When an individual overhears an ethnic slur, even relatively egalitarian-minded individuals may revert
to discriminatory judgments." 96
Although Miller predates the Supreme Court's formulation of a strong
presumption in favor of applying harmless error analysis, 97 the Fourth
Circuit's application of the impartial adjudicator exception is consistent

90. Id. at 62-63 (citing Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and
White Discriminationand Prejudice:A LiteratureReview, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL Butr. 546 (1980);

Gaertner, Helping Behavior and RacialDiscrimination Among Liberals and Conservatives, 25
J. PEaSONALrry AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 335 (1973); Gaertner & Dovidio, Subtlety of White
Racism, Arousal and Helping Behavior, 35 J. PERSONALrrY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 691 (1977);
Weitz, Attitude, Voice and Behavior: A Repressed Affect Model of InterracialInteraction, 24
J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 14 (1972)).
91. Id. at 63 (citing Dienstbier, Positive and Negative Prejudice: Interactions of Prejudice
with Race and Social Desirability, 38 J. PERSONALITY 198 (1970); Katz & Glass, An Ambivalence-Amplification Theory of Behavior Toward the Stigmatized, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTERGROup RELATIONS (W. Austin & S. Worchel eds. 1979); Linville & Jones, Polarized
Appraisals of Out-group Members, 38 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 689 (1980)).
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id. at 70.
94. Id. at 64 (citing Carver, Ganellen, Froming & Chambers, Modeling: An Analysis in
Terms of Category Accessibility, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 403 (1983)).
95. See, e.g., Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19 ("[T]he prosecutor's opinion carries with it the
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the government's judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.").
96. Greenberg & Pyszczynski, supra note 89, at 64. See also R. MATLON, Communication
in the Legal Process 306 (1988) (citing Brand, Ruiz, & Padilla, Ethnic Identification and
Preference: A Review, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 860 (1974); Brigham, Ethnic Stereotypes, 76
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 15 (1971); Sigall & Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little
Faking, 18 J.PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 247 (1971); and Taylor, Race, Sex, and
Expression of Self-fulfilling Prophecies in a Laboratory Teaching Situation, 37 J. PERSONALI=Y
& Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 897 (1979) for the proposition that "[s]igns clearly point toward juries'
being influenced by the race of the defendant. What unfortunately appears to be happening
is that jurors are assigning characteristics and propensities to individual racial group members
based on the stereotypes they possess about the characteristics and propensities of that racial
group generally.").

97. See Rose, 478 U.S. 570. See also supra note 15.
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with present doctrine. Even if the Miller decision stands in contrast to the
Court's commitment to extending the harmless error doctrine, the Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed that eliminating racial discrimination in the criminal justice system is of paramount constitutional interest. 98 A racially biased
jury violates both the sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury
and the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection. 9 The Supreme
Court remains highly sensitive to racially based constitutional deprivations
and its recent affirmation of the biased adjudicator exception lends strong
support to applying the exception in these cases.
B.

The Uncertainty Principle Applied

By comparing the racially prejudicial remarks in Miller to three previously
recognized exceptions to the harmless error rule-admission of coerced
confessions, total denial of counsel, and lack of an impartial judgel°°-the
Fourth Circuit found the same common characteristic and determined that
"the error infects the entire proceeding making it impossible to evaluate
the effect of the error on the jury. As a consequence, with such errors
reversal is automatic." 10
' 1 An appellate court is unable to determine with
certainty the actual impact of the error on the jurors because their impartiality is implicated. 0 2 The court admitted, "speculation about the effect of
the error on the verdict is fruitless."' 3
Although the court combines the uncertainty principle with the impartial
adjudicator exception,'0 4 the overlap between the two harmless error exception theories is instructive. The potential for the prosecution's arguments
to trigger racial prejudice adds even more confusion and speculation to a
requisite determination of prejudicial effect.105 In Miller the rejection of
harmless error analysis came in part from characteristic uncertainty in these
situations. Empirical socio-psychological research suggests that Miller is
correct in assuming that arguments designed to invoke racial stereotypes
have a pervasive impact on the jury.'0 6 To apply harmless error analysis in
these circumstances would waste judicial resources and potentially lead to
tremendous injustice since the reviewing court will never be able to deter-

98. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 (1986) ("[T]he court has repeatedly
rejected all arguments that a conviction may stand despite racial discrimination in the selection
of the grand jury." (citations omitted)).
99. See supra notes 3 and 8.
100. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
101. 583 F.2d at 708.
102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 707-08.
105. See Mause, supra note 22.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 89-96.
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mine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the
07
conviction. Therefore, a rule of automatic reversal is required.
CONCLUSION

Arguments appealing to the racial prejudices of the jury are anathema to
a multiracial society founded on principles of racial equality and equal
treatment under law.0 8 Justice Brandeis' observation on the didactic function
of the state in Omstead v. United States'09 is highly relevant to this form

of forensic prosecutorial misconduct. "Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its

example."" 0 Where the prosecution resorts to racial prejudice in order to
secure a conviction, highly prized constitutional values are profoundly
defeated. Dormant racial prejudices are reborn and demeaning racial stereotypes are promulgated with the benediction of the state."' Where the
impartiality of the jury as fact-finder is impaired by the misconduct of the

prosecution, the State can boast only a hollow victory: at best, a conviction
tainted by racial considerations or, at worst, a conviction of an innocent
defendant." 2 To apply the harmless error rule here in the name of judicial
economy is illogical given the near impossibility of the reviewing court's
inquiry and the likelihood that such errors are invariably prejudicial to the
defendant. The potential influence of racial arguments is so difficult to
ascertain that the uncertainty principle should apply to provide an exception

grounded in the implicit requirements of harmless error doctrine. The
impartial adjudicator exception could also serve to recognize that the primary
result of these arguments is to bias the jury.
The mere existence of racial arguments is a threat to the integrity of the

judicial system and thus there clearly exists a need to deter such prosecutorial
misconduct.' 3 Since the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the errant
107. See supra notes 17 and 62-70.
108. United States v. Caldwell, 23 M.J. 748, 751 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987) ("[A]n appeal to racial
prejudice is repugnant to our system and has no place in an American courtroom."). See
United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th Cir. 1978) ("[A]ny appeal to racial prejudice
is a foul blow which must be rejected by the courts."). Racial arguments threaten equal
protection values by adding a burden to minority defendants not shared by non-minority
defendants. See, e.g., Haynes, 481 F.2d at 159 ("If there is anything more antithetical to the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment than the injection against a black man of racial
prejudice ... we do not know what it is.").
109. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
110. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
111. See supra notes 85-92. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 1595
("Because of the high visibility of the prosecutor's actions, the failure to subject racially biased
prosecutorial conduct to automatic reversal would project an unacceptable public message
concerning society's indifference to racial equality in the criminal justice system.").
112. See Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp 533, 547 (D.N.J. 1985) ("[Ihe jury was permitted
to draw inferences of guilt based solely on the race of the [defendants].").
113. See Note, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINoLoGY 457 (1983) [hereinafter Harmless Error].
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prosecutor from effective rebuke in civil court,1 4 the only effective redress
for the target of the misconduct is a new trial. Because voluntary compliance
with the American Bar Association Model Rules of Conduct" 5 has proven
insufficient, a strong standard of automatic reversal is required." 6 In the
oft-quoted words of Justice Sutherland, "[The prosecutor] may strike hard
blows, but he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.""l 7 Justice is not served
if such misconduct can escape effective reproach by hiding behind the veil
of harmless error.
STEVEN

D. DEBROTA

114. S. NAHMOD, Civiw Ri-'rrs AND Crvn. LIBERTIES LITIGATION 438 (2d ed. 1986) ("Since
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), it is clear that prosecutorial immunity from liability
for damages attaches to those acts of the prosecutor performed in the role of advocate.").
115. See United States ex ret. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 157 (1973) (citing ABA
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function and the Defense Function
§ 5.8(c) & (d), commentary at 128-29 (1970)).
116. See Harmless Error,supra note 113, at 458 ("The repeated application of a harmless
error standard to violations of trial rules has resulted in repeated violations of these rules by
prosecutors and judges.").
117. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934).

